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Introduction
In early December 2007, the island of Bali in Indonesia 
hosted the 13th Conference of the Parties (COP13) 
to the United National Framework Convention on 
Climate Change and the 3rd Conference of the Parties 
serving as a Meeting of the Parties (COP/MOP3) 
to the Kyoto Protocol.1 Attended by almost 11,000 
participants and observers from across the globe, 
Bali marked the climax of a period of unparalleled 
international climate change summitry (Chasek, 2007). 
The decisions taken at COP13 have been variously 
hailed as a ‘major breakthrough’ (Egenhofer, 2007) and 
as an utter failure – ‘the mother of all no-deals’, to quote 
Sunita Narain (2008) and ‘even worse than the Kyoto 
Protocol’ according to George Monbiot (2007).2 
This article provides a brief overview of the current 
global policy framework for addressing climate change, 
outlines the key issues facing international negotiators as 
they gathered for COP13, highlights the main decisions 
of the Bali conference (the so-called Bali ‘roadmap’) and 
assesses their significance. Attention is also given to the 
implications of COP13 for New Zealand.
The evolving global policy framework – 
a brief history 
The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC) provides the guiding principles 
and negotiating platform for multilateral action to 
address human-induced climate change. Negotiated in 
1992, the UNFCCC took effect in 1994; by 2007 it 
had been ratified by 192 parties, including the United 
States. The ‘ultimate objective’ of the Convention is 
the ‘stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in 
the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous 
anthropogenic [i.e. human-induced] interference in the 
climate system’. Amongst the key principles specified in 
Article 3 of the Convention is the requirement that: 
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The Parties should protect the climate system for 
the present and future generations of humankind, 
on the basis of equity and in accordance with 
their common but differentiated responsibilities 
and respective capabilities. Accordingly, the 
developed country Parties should take the lead 
in combating climate change and the adverse 
effects thereof.
In response to growing scientific concerns during the 
early-to-mid 1990s that the process of human-induced 
climate change was accelerating, the international 
community negotiated a new agreement during 
1995-97 (under the UNFCCC) to curb the growth in 
greenhouse gas emissions. The main elements of what 
became known as the Kyoto Protocol were agreed in late 
1997 – although many of the technical details took a 
further decade to negotiate and implement (see Ward 
and Boston, 2007). The Protocol entered into force 
on 16 February 2005 and as of early 2008 had been 
ratified by at least 175 countries, including all but one 
developed country (i.e. the United States). Under the 
Kyoto Protocol, the 38 industrialized countries (known 
as Annex 1 Parties under the UNFCCC) agreed to 
fixed and legally-binding responsibility targets3 for their 
greenhouse gas emissions during a five-year period 
(2008-12); this is known as the first commitment 
period (or CP1). Overall, Annex 1 Parties (including 
1 The author would like to thank Stuart Dymond, Hugh Logan, Adrian 
Macey, Martin Manning and Murray Ward for their helpful comments 
on an earlier version of this paper. 
2 For other views, see Diringer (2008), ENB (2007), Fuller and Revkin 
(2007), Müller (2008), and Spotts (2007).
3 Annex 1 Parties are not necessarily required under the Kyoto 
Protocol to reduce their domestic emissions by the specific targets 
agreed to, but rather to take responsibility for reductions of the 
agreed magnitude. Parties have the option, if they wish, of achieving 
these reductions through the purchase of Kyoto-compliant emission 
allowances on the international market or via the Clean Development 
Mechanism. For this reason, the Kyoto targets should be thought of 
as responsibility targets rather than domestic reduction targets.
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the US at the time) agreed to an aggregate reduction 
in their emissions of about 5% relative to 1990 levels. 
The various national targets, however, differ markedly, 
with some countries accepting much deeper cuts than 
others. For instance, New Zealand’s target for CP1 is 
100% of 1990 levels.4 By comparison, Australia’s target 
is 108% and the European Union’s is 92% (while that 
of the US was 93%). In order to achieve these targets 
in an effective and efficient manner, the Kyoto Protocol 
provided for the establishment of three so-called ‘flexible 
mechanisms’: an international emissions trading regime, 
the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and Joint 
Implementation (JI). 
In accordance with the principle of ‘common but 
differentiated responsibilities’, developing countries 
were not required under Kyoto to take on legally 
binding emission-reduction targets. Nevertheless, 
under Article 10, non-Annex 1 Parties agreed to take 
a range of measures designed to improve the quality 
of the reporting of their anthropogenic emissions 
and to ‘formulate, implement, publish and regularly 
update national … programmes containing measures 
to mitigate climate change and measures to facilitate 
adequate adaptation to climate change’. 
It has been fashionable in some quarters to regard the 
Kyoto Protocol as a failure – politically, economically 
and environmentally. But such a stark assessment is 
questionable. After all, CP1 has barely begun, so it 
is too early for conclusive judgements. That said, in 
2005 (the most recent year for which reliable data are 
available) the emissions (including those from land use, 
land-use chance and forestry) of the Annex 1 Parties 
that have ratified Kyoto were, on average, nearly 10% 
below their annual allocations for CP1. Note, however, 
that this result reflects the large emissions reductions in 
Russia and Eastern Europe during the 1990s following 
the collapse of the Soviet Union. Excluding such 
countries yields a rather different picture. Moreover, 
total emissions across all Annex 1 countries (including 
the US) are currently tracking upwards. 
Nevertheless, virtually all Annex 1 Parties have reaffirmed 
their commitment to fulfilling their CP1 obligations. 
Thus far, only Canada (of the 37 developed countries 
to ratify the Protocol) has given any indication that it 
might be unwilling to meet its responsibility target for 
2008-12 (i.e. the government has said that it will be 
impossible to keep domestic emissions within Canada’s 
CP1 cap and that Kyoto-compliant emission units will 
not be purchased offshore). Whether the government 
retains such a policy stance over the coming years 
remains to be seen. 
Kyoto was, of course, never intended to be more than 
a limited step in what will be a multi-generational 
endeavour to mitigate climate change and adapt to its 
impacts. Its authors were fully aware that constraining 
the growth of emissions in the developed world, although 
vital, would be insufficient to reduce global emissions, 
particularly in a context of rapid economic growth in 
major developing countries such as China and India. 
Nor would capping emissions merely for five years make 
much difference to greenhouse gas concentrations in the 
atmosphere over the longer term. 
But while acknowledging its imperfections, Kyoto can be 
regarded as a positive, indeed crucial, initiative. To quote the 
text of the Summary for Policymakers prepared by Working 
Group 3 of the IPCC (and endorsed by the governments 
of every country involved in the IPCC process): 
Notable achievements of the UNFCCC and its 
Kyoto Protocol are the establishment of a global 
response to the climate problem, stimulation 
of an array of national policies, the creation 
of an international carbon market and the 
establishment of new institutional mechanisms 
that provide the foundation for future mitigation 
efforts (high agreement, much evidence) (IPCC, 
2007c, p.21).
Of these achievements, arguably the most significant 
has been creation of a global emissions trading scheme 
(including the related systems of accounting, reporting 
and review, national greenhouse gas inventories and 
registries, etc.). All being well, this scheme will be 
expanded and enhanced over the coming decades, 
thereby ensuring effective mitigation at the lowest 
possible cost.
Looking beyond 2012
Even before the Kyoto Protocol came into effect in 
2005, international attention was already turning to 
what should happen when CP1 ends in December 
4 During the first commitment period (2008-2012), New Zealand is 
permitted to emit five times its 1990 emissions levels and must 
take responsibility for emissions in excess of this amount (i.e. by 
purchasing Kyoto-compliant emission allowances).
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2012. In framing an appropriate response, the global 
policy community has been increasingly mindful of 
the following considerations (see Stern, 2006; Garnaut 
Climate Change Review, 2008):
1 the growing strength of the scientific evidence – 
as reflected in the Fourth Assessment Report of 
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 
published during 2007 – that ‘most of the observed 
increase in global average temperatures since the mid-
20th century is very likely due to the observed increase 
in anthropogenic greenhouse gas concentrations’ 
(IPCCa, 2007, p.10), (due especially to the burning 
of fossil fuels and deforestation);
2 the need to avoid an increase in the global mean 
surface temperature much in excess of 2ºC (i.e. 
above pre-industrial levels) – in order to reduce the 
risk of large-scale and irreversible adverse impacts, 
such as the loss of much of the Amazon rainforest 
or the disintegration of large parts of the Greenland 
and/or West Antarctic ice-sheets;
3 the need to ensure – if avoiding significantly 
more than 2ºC of warming is the objective – that 
concentrations of carbon dioxide equivalent (CO
2
e) 
are stabilized at around 450 parts per million (or 
lower). This, in turn, requires that global greenhouse 
gas emissions peak no later than 2020 and are then 
reduced by at least 50% by 2050 compared to 2000 
levels (and possibly as much as 85%) (see Table 1; 
IPCCc, 2007; Meinshausen, 2006); 
4 the strong case for developed countries to take the lead 
in mitigation and adaptation efforts on the grounds 
of historical responsibility, distributive justice, 
economic capacity and technical capability;
5 the fact that emissions from developing countries 
now constitute over 50% of global emissions, thus 
making it impossible to achieve global emission 
reductions of the scale, or within the timeframe, 
suggested in point 3 unless both developed and 
developing countries reduce their emissions 
significantly below a business-as-usual scenario;
6 the requirement, if global emissions are to peak no 
later than 2020, for developed countries to take on 
responsibility targets beyond 2012 that entail substantial 
cuts on 1990 levels (e.g. 25-40% by 2020) and for many 
developing countries (especially the major emerging 
economies) to adopt vigorous and comprehensive 
measures designed to reduce the growth in their 
emissions (including those from deforestation); and
Table 1: Characteristics of greenhouse gas stabilisation scenarios
Scenario 
category
CO
2
 equivalent 
concentration 
(parts per 
million CO
2
 
equivalent)
Global mean 
temperature 
increase above 
pre-industrial 
at equilibrium 
using ‘best 
estimate’ 
climate 
sensitivitya
(oC)
Change in 
global CO
2
 
emissions in 
2050 (% of 2000 
emissions)
Range of 
reduction in 
GDP in 2050 
because of 
mitigation 
(%)
Allowed 
emissions 
by Annex 
I Parties 
in 2020 (% 
change 
from 1990 
emissions)
Allowed 
emissions 
by Annex 
I Parties 
in 2050 (% 
change 
from 1990 
emissions)
I 445-490 2.0-2.4 -85 to -50 Decrease of 
up to 5.5
-25 to -40 -80 to -95
II 490-535 2.4-2.8 -60 to -30
III 535-590 2.8-3.2 -30 to +5 Slight gain to 
decrease of 4
-10 to -30 -40 to -90
IV 590-710 3.2-4.0 +10 to +60 Gain of 1 to 
decrease of 2
0 to -25 -30 to -80
V 710-855 4.0-4.9 +25 to +85
VI 855-1130 4.9-6.1 +90 to +140
Source: based on data from IPCC (2007c). 
Note: aAccording to the IPCC (2007a), the best estimate of climate sensitivity is 3ºC
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7 the desirability, eventually, for agreement to be 
reached on a stringent, legally-binding multilateral 
treaty which defines the total global ‘budget’ of 
greenhouse gases that can be emitted over a relatively 
long period of time (i.e. many decades) in the 
interests of stabilizing CO
2
e concentrations at an 
agreed level. Such a budget will need to be allocated 
between countries in accordance with a set of agreed 
principles and, above all, ensure that the burden of 
adjusting to a low-carbon future is fairly shared. The 
principle of equal per capita emission rights is likely 
to figure prominently in any such burden-sharing 
formula (see Garnaut Climate Change Review, 2008, 
p.30). Substantial assistance will also need to be 
provided to developing countries to help them adapt 
to the growing economic, social and environmental 
impacts of climate change.
Ensuring that global emissions peak by 2020 and then 
fall substantially will be very challenging, not least 
because of the power of vested interests (especially the 
fossil fuel industry), the long lags in the relevant policy 
processes, the high degree of path dependence in global 
energy and transport systems, and the tendency for the 
short-term self-interest of individual nations to prevail 
over the common good.
Even achieving a broad global consensus on long-term 
(e.g. 2050) emission-reduction targets has thus far 
proved elusive, partly because the US reluctance to 
endorse stringent emission reductions of the magnitude 
suggested in point 3 above. Progress towards more 
vigorous international action has also been rendered 
difficult for at least two other reasons. First, the Bush 
Administration has steadfastly rejected ratification of 
the Kyoto Protocol and, until very recently, has opposed 
taking on legally-binding emission-reduction targets. 
Against this, there has been considerable action at the 
sub-national level (i.e. via states and cities) in the US, 
and there is a reasonable prospect that the Congress 
will support legislation, during 2008, to enforce 
emission reductions.5 Second, to date most of the newly 
industrialized countries (e.g. the Gulf states, Israel, 
South Korea, Singapore, etc.) and the major emerging 
economies (e.g. Brazil, China and India), have rejected 
the idea of non-Annex 1 countries taking on any kind 
of legally-binding commitments – whether in the form of 
intensity targets, emission-reduction targets or targets 
for renewable energy. 
Their rationale for rejecting such commitments can be 
summarized as follows:
1 it is the moral duty of the main developed countries 
to act first; this is because such countries are largely 
responsible for the significant increase in the 
atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases 
since the 18th century, and their emissions per capita 
are typically five-to-ten times those of developing 
countries;
2 many developed countries have taken insufficient 
action to meet their international obligations under 
the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol, both with 
respect to their domestic mitigation efforts and their 
assistance to developing countries (e.g. with regard 
to technology transfer, capacity building and the 
funding of adaptation); and
3 expecting developing countries to sacrifice their 
economic development in order to curb their 
emissions is unrealistic given the moral priority of 
alleviating poverty and the unwillingness of the US 
to fulfill its international obligations. 
Mindful of the need for developed countries to show 
leadership, the European Union made a unilateral 
commitment in early 2007 to cut their emissions by 
20% by 2020 (compared to 1990 levels). It also declared 
its willingness to reduce emissions by up to 30% if 
other developed countries agree to commensurate 
commitments. Various other developed countries, 
such as Norway, have also made significant medium-
term commitments to reduce their emissions. Closer 
to New Zealand, the Interim Report of the Garnaut 
Climate Change Review has suggested that Australia 
should follow the example of the European Union and 
take unilateral, unconditional action (e.g. in setting 
interim domestic emission-reduction targets) as well as 
offering to accept even tougher targets in the context 
of agreed international action (Garnaut, 2008, p.40). 
Nevertheless, without further change in the US policy 
stance, it will be difficult to secure a multilateral solution 
to human-induced climate change. In the short-term, 
therefore, much will depend on the position adopted by 
5 For instance, there are various Bills dealing with climate change 
currently before both the Senate and the House of Representatives, 
and one or more or these have a reasonable prospect of securing 
majority support. That said, President Bush may veto such 
legislation.
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the new US administration (following the Presidential 
election in November 2008) and the balance of forces 
within Congress.
Towards Bali and a second commitment 
period
The Kyoto Protocol provides (in Article 3.9) for further 
commitment periods for Annex 1 Parties after CP1. 
But neither the precise nature, nor the duration, of 
such commitment periods are specified. Theoretically, 
a second commitment period (CP2), together with the 
issue of which Parties it applies to and how, could be 
negotiated under the framework provided by Kyoto 
or as part of a new protocol under the UNFCCC. 
Either way, a key concern is to avoid any gap between 
CP1 and subsequent commitment periods because 
of the uncertainty and complications that such a gap 
would cause. For instance, global carbon markets and 
investment in low-carbon energy sources could be 
significantly disrupted unless the nature of the second 
commitment period (and related domestic policy 
measures in major economies) is clarified by early 2010. 
Moreover, any new international agreement on climate 
change is likely to take several years for the Parties to 
ratify and come into force. For such reasons, it has 
been widely accepted that, ideally, a new agreement 
should be crafted by the end of 2009 (i.e. at the planned 
UNFCCC conference in Copenhagen). 
Under the Kyoto Protocol, Parties were required to 
initiate consideration of future commitments by 
developed countries at least seven years before the expiry 
of CP1. Accordingly, at the first Meeting of the Parties 
(MOP1) to the Kyoto Protocol in Montreal in late 2005 
an Ad Hoc Working Group (AWG) was established on 
‘Further Commitments for Annex I Parties under the 
Kyoto Protocol’. The AWG met on four occasions during 
2006-07 to discuss mitigation potentials, measures and 
technologies and considered various background reports 
prepared by the UNFCCC Secretariat. Separately, 
the Parties to the UNFCCC agreed in Montreal to 
undertake discussions during 2006-07 to enable an 
exchange of views on ‘strategic approaches for long-
term cooperative action to address climate change’.6 
This consultative process, known as the ‘Dialogue on 
long-term cooperative action to address climate change 
by enhancing implementation of the Convention’, has 
focused on both adaptation and mitigation (including 
realizing the full potential of various technologies and 
market-based opportunities). 
Hence, in the lead-up to COP13 in Bali there were 
two separate, but closely related, processes under way 
through the auspices of the UN – a Protocol track and 
a Convention track. Additionally, climate change issues, 
and especially the question of what to do post-2012, 
figured prominently during 2007 on the agendas of high-
level summits, such as the G8, APEC and CHOGM, as 
well as many other formal and informal international 
forums (e.g. see Calgren, 2007; Chasek, 2007). 
Critical to such discussions were two interconnected 
issues: one procedural, the other substantive (bear in 
mind that in negotiating contexts procedural matters 
often have major implications for substance):
1 Procedurally, the key issue was what kind of negotiating 
process should be instituted in order to secure a 
post-2012 agreement? In particular, should the AWG 
and Dialogue processes be combined into a single 
track or should they continue (albeit with some 
modifications) until COP15 in Copenhagen as separate 
processes? A single-track approach was favoured by 
some developed countries, including New Zealand, 
in the interests of securing a coherent and integrated 
package of measures. By contrast, most developing 
countries favoured a multi-track approach, believing 
that this would help protect the distinction between 
Annex 1 and non-Annex 1 countries and thereby 
minimize developing country obligations post-21012. 
Aside from this, there was a separate procedural issue 
of how the negotiating process for post-2012 should 
relate to other processes, such as the planned second 
review of the Kyoto Protocol (under Article 9).
2 Substantively, the key issues included how specific 
the negotiating framework for a post-2012 agreement 
should be, including whether there should be a 
mandate (like, for instance, the ‘Berlin Mandate’ in 
1995 that paved the way for the Kyoto Protocol) 
or a more general roadmap. And irrespective of the 
nature of the negotiating template and parameters, 
what principles and considerations should inform the 
negotiating process, what issues should be on (and off) 
the agenda, how should the negotiations be sequenced 
and in accordance with what specific timetable?
6 See Decision 1/CP.11, paragraph 1, COP 11, Montreal.
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The events leading up to Bali indicated that agreement 
on a broad roadmap would be achievable. Nevertheless, 
the shape of this roadmap remained contentious due to 
disagreement amongst the major players on a variety of 
important issues. These included:
1 What overall level of ambition should the international 
community aspire to achieve in relation to medium-
term (2020) and longer-term (2050) global emission-
reduction targets (and atmospheric stabilization 
targets) and should explicit targets (and, if so, of 
what kind) be agreed to at Bali or sometime later? 
2 Should all developed countries, including the US, 
be expected to take on legally-binding emission-
reduction targets for the immediate post-2012 
period or could some exceptions be tolerated (e.g. 
in a context where certain countries, while refusing 
to ratify an international agreement, nonetheless 
agreed to make a ‘comparable effort’ to reduce their 
domestic emissions)?
3 What should be the nature and extent of the 
contributions of non-Annex 1 Parties to a post-2012 
arrangement and what criteria should guide the level 
of such contributions? More specifically, should 
certain non-Annex 1 Parties be expected to take 
on explicit and binding commitments or should any 
agreed measures be only voluntary in nature? 
4 What parameters should be set in relation to other 
key policy issues, such as reducing deforestation in 
developing countries, enhancing adaptation assistance, 
improving technology development and transfer, and 
determining the length of the proposed CP2 and related 
issues (such as the emission baseline year)? 
The Bali ‘Roadmap’
What, then, was actually achieved at COP13? The 
short answer is more than most pessimists expected, 
but less than would have been desirable. In formal 
terms, COP13 adopted 15 decisions (of varying 
importance) and COP/MOP3 a further 13 decisions 
(ENB, 2007, p.1). The main elements of the Bali 
‘roadmap’ or ‘action plan’, as it is variously called, can 
be summarized as follows.
Negotiating tracks
Despite efforts by various developed countries, 
including New Zealand, there was little support within 
the developing world for an integrated, single-track 
negotiating process. Instead, it was agreed at Bali that 
there would be twin-track negotiations leading up 
to COP15, together with the second review of the 
Kyoto Protocol – in effect, therefore, three separate 
processes. The first track will involve the continuation 
of the deliberations of the Ad Hoc Working Group on 
Further Commitments for Annex 1 Parties. (Note that 
the US is not part of this process.) The second track 
will replace the Dialogue process and will be conducted 
via a new Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-Term 
Cooperation under the Convention. Importantly, 
both tracks have a common end date (COP15). A 
detailed work programme for the Protocol track 
has been agreed (see Table 2); a programme for the 
Convention track is in preparation. In order to make 
progress on the wide range of issues to be negotiated, 
both AWGs will meet four times during 2008. These 
meetings will be held at similar times and locations 
in the interests of coordination and minimizing the 
pressures on negotiators. 
It remains to be seen when and how the Protocol and 
Convention tracks will converge. But at some point 
detailed coordination will be essential because any 
agreement by developed countries to take on new 
responsibility targets for CP2 will be contingent upon the 
willingness of the larger emerging economies to adopt 
mitigation measures of various kinds. The stringency of 
the agreed targets will also be influenced by the nature of 
any deal to reduce deforestation in developing countries 
(see next page). 
Substantive issues
1. The level of ambition
On the issue of stabilization objectives, including 
medium-term and long-term global emission-
reduction targets, there was only modest progress at 
Bali. In a so-called ‘non-paper’ prepared by Howard 
Bamsey and Sandea de Wet (the co-facilitators of 
the Dialogue on long-term cooperative action), and 
distributed to delegates on 8 December, the following 
wording was proposed to guide negotiations for a 
post-2012 deal:
… preventing the worst impacts of climate 
change will require Parties included in the 
Annex 1 to the Convention as a group to reduce 
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emissions in a range of 25-40 per cent below 
1990 levels by 2020 and … global emissions of 
greenhouse gases need to peak in the next 10 to 
15 years and be reduced to very low levels, well 
below half of levels in 2000 by 2050.
There were predictable objections to this wording. 
On the one hand, some developed countries expressed 
concern at the lack of any explicit reference to the need 
for developing countries to reduce their emissions (i.e. 
below a business-as-usual scenario), nor any indication 
of the likely magnitude of this reduction. Be that 
as it may, the specific reference to global emissions 
needing to peak within the next 10-15 years carried 
very obvious implications for the emission path of 
developing countries (i.e. that they must diverge 
substantially from a business-as-usual scenario). On 
the other hand, the US remained adamantly opposed 
to explicit targets (claiming that Bali should set the 
negotiating framework but not the ‘destination’), and 
drew some support for its stance from a few other 
developed countries. In the end, the terms of reference 
for the AWG on Long-term Cooperative Action under 
the Convention stated:
Sessions Work Programme
Fifth Session (first part) – late 
March and early April 2008
Analysis of means that may be available to Annex 1 Parties to reach their 
emission reduction targets, including: emissions trading and project-based 
mechanisms under the Kyoto Protocol; the rules to guide the treatment of land 
use, land-use change and forestry; the GHGs, sectors and source categories to be 
covered, and possible approaches targeting sectoral emissions; and identification 
of ways to enhance the effectiveness of these means and their contributions to 
sustainable development.
Fifth Session (second part) – 
early June 2008
Continuation of the above, together with work on relevant methodological issues, 
including the methodologies to be applied for estimating anthropogenic emissions 
and the global warming potentials of GHGs.
Sixth Session (first part) – 
August or September 2008
Consideration of information on the potential environmental, economic and social 
consequences, including spillover effects on all Parties, in particular developing 
country Parties, of available tools, policies, measures and methodologies available 
to Annex 1 Parties.
Sixth Session (second part) – 
early December 2008
Continue and adopt conclusions on the issues considered in the first part of the 
Sixth Session, and revert to, and adopt conclusions on, the tasks considered 
earlier, including: (a) analysis of the mitigation potential, effectiveness, efficiency, 
costs and benefits of current and future policies, measures and technologies at 
the disposal of Annex 1 Parties, appropriate in different national circumstances, 
taking into account their environmental, economic and social consequences, their 
sectoral dimensions, and the international context in which they are deployed; 
and (b) the scale of emission reductions to be achieved by Annex 1 Parties, 
through their domestic and international efforts, and analysis of their contribution 
to the ultimate objective of the Convention, ensuring due attention to the issues 
mentioned in the second sentence of Article 2 of the Convention.
Seventh and Eighth Sessions – 
2009
Adopt conclusions on the scale of emission reductions to be achieved by Annex 1 
Parties in aggregate and the allocation of the corresponding mitigation effort, and 
agree on further commitments, including new quantitative emission limitation and 
reduction commitments, and the duration of the commitment period(s); and adopt 
conclusions on the legal implications arising from the work of the AWG.
Table 2: Timetable of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Further Commitments for Annex 
1 Parties under the Kyoto Protocol
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Recognizing that deep cuts in global emissions will 
be required to achieve the ultimate objective of 
the Convention and emphasizing the urgency to 
address climate change as indicated in the Fourth 
Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change …
A footnote was included in the preamble referring to 
the relevant pages in the various IPCC reports, thereby 
signaling, if not explicitly endorsing, the level of global 
emission reductions required over the medium-to-
longer term.7
But while explicit targets were not included in 
the terms of reference of the AWG on Long-term 
Cooperative Action, the ‘conclusions’ adopted at 
Bali by the AWG on Further Commitments included 
the following:
The AWG … noted the usefulness of the ranges 
referred to in the contribution of Working 
Group III to the Fourth Assessment Report 
(AR4) … and that this report indicates that 
global emissions of greenhouse gases … need 
to peak in the next 10-15 years and reduced 
to very low levels, well below half of levels in 
2000 by the middle of the twenty-first century 
in order to stabilize their concentrations in 
the atmosphere at the lowest levels assessed 
by the IPCC … [This] would require Annex 
1 Parties as a group to reduce emissions in a 
range of 25-40 per cent below 1990 levels by 
2020, through means that may be available to 
these Parties to reach their emission reduction 
targets …
In short, this wording suggests that, with the exception of 
the US (and to a lesser extent Russia), the international 
community has broadly accepted the need for very 
deep cuts in global emissions by 2050 and that, as a 
guideline, Annex 1 Parties (as a group) will be expected 
to reduce their emissions in a range of 25-40% below 
1990 levels by 2020. These parameters will no doubt 
inform the negotiations during 2008-09 and influence 
the magnitude of the CP2 responsibility targets for 
Annex 1 Parties.
2. The responsibilities of developed and developing 
countries
In framing the Bali ‘roadmap’, COP13 focused on four 
‘building blocks’ and the interconnections between 
them: mitigation, adaptation, technology and finance. 
As expected, there was intense and protracted debate 
over the respective mitigation responsibilities of Annex 1 
and non-Annex 1 Parties and the nature of the assistance 
that developing countries could expect to receive from 
the developed world. 
COP13 eventually decided on the following crucial 
paragraphs (as embodied in the terms of reference of 
the AWG on Long-term Cooperative Action):
1(b)(i) Measurable, reportable and verifiable 
nationally appropriate mitigation commitments 
or actions, including quantified emission 
limitation and reduction objectives, by all 
developed country Parties, while ensuring the 
comparability of efforts among them, taking 
into account differences in their national 
circumstances;
1(b)(ii) Nationally appropriate mitigation 
actions by developing country Parties in the 
context of sustainable development, supported 
and enabled by technology, financing and 
capacity-building, in a measurable, reportable 
and verifiable manner.
Various aspects of this wording deserve comment. First, 
there is a potentially significant change in the language 
used in these paragraphs, with a distinction being made 
between ‘developed’ and ‘developing’ countries rather 
than between ‘Annex 1’ and ‘non-Annex 1’. This is 
seen by many observers as a breakthrough, signaling an 
acceptance by non-Annex 1 countries that mitigation 
responsibilities must in the future be more appropriately 
differentiated and reflect the relative affluence, economic 
resources and technical capacity of individual countries 
(ENB, 2007, p.19). But in transitioning from the 
previous Annex 1/non-Annex 1 distinction, the 
challenge will be to define and agree upon a variegated 
classification system and then determine the mitigation 
responsibilities of the countries in each category. One 
risk of moving to a new framework is that certain Annex 
1 countries may seek to reduce their responsibilities 
in CP2, thus triggering a loss of goodwill and more 
convoluted and protracted negotiations. 
7 See FCCC/CP/2007/L.7/Rev.1, 14 December 2007. The footnote 
refers readers to IPCCc, 2007, p.39 and p.90, and IPCCd, 2007, 
p.776.
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Second, the mitigation effort expected of developing 
countries is limited to ‘actions’ rather than ‘commitments’ 
(i.e. they will not be expected to take on legally-binding, 
economy-wide emission-reduction targets). Nevertheless, 
there are many other possible (and useful) ‘actions’ – 
including sectoral approaches (i.e. for carbon intensive 
industries), targets for renewable energy, intensity 
targets, and measures to limit deforestation – and it is 
possible that some of these could be made binding for 
the larger and more advanced non-Annex 1 countries. 
There was some dispute during the closing stages of the 
Bali conference as to whether the words ‘measurable, 
reportable and verifiable’ at the end of paragraph 1(b)
(ii) referred to the actions of developed countries in 
providing ‘technology, financing and capacity-building’ 
or the ‘appropriate mitigation actions’ of developing 
countries, or both (Müller, 2008, p.5). Clarification, by 
representatives of the G77, that these words included 
the actions of developing countries helped persuade the 
US, in the words of Paula Dobriansky (the leader of 
the US delegation), ‘to go forward and join consensus’ 
(Fuller and Revkin, 2007). In effect, therefore, the major 
developing economies have committed themselves, 
for the first time under the Convention, to taking 
‘measurable, reportable and verifiable’ mitigation 
actions. Also, the US is fully engaged in the process. 
Both outcomes represent significant steps forward. 
Equally, paragraph 1(b)(ii) makes it clear that developing 
countries, in undertaking ‘mitigation actions’, will 
be supported by ‘technology, financing and capacity-
building’ from developed countries.
Third, the wording of paragraph 1(b)(i) implies that 
the mitigation efforts of developed countries can take 
the form of either ‘commitments’ or ‘actions’. The 
provision for the latter was designed to accommodate 
US objections to legally-binding emission-reduction 
targets. The problem with including this kind of ‘escape 
clause’, however, is that it potentially opens up the 
possibility of other developed countries (e.g. Canada 
and Japan) choosing not to take on responsibility 
targets for CP2. If this were to occur, potentially the 
whole architecture of Kyoto would collapse. Another 
challenge posed by paragraph 1(b)(i) is the meaning 
of ‘comparability of efforts’. This, of course, is part of 
the wider issue of determining the nature of fairness in 
relation to international burden sharing – both with 
respect to mitigation and adaptation.
Other decisions at Bali
Three related matters, also decided at COP13, deserve 
mention. First, after years of difficult negotiations, 
agreement was reached on the implementation of 
the Adaptation Fund (established under the Kyoto 
Protocol). This Fund is designed to assist developing 
countries to adapt to the impacts of climate change 
with funding being secured via a 2% levy on the carbon 
credits generated through CDM projects. In accordance 
with the Bali agreement, a new independent Adaptation 
Fund Board will be created (under the COP/MOP), the 
Global Environment Facility of the United Nations will 
provide secretariat services, and the World Bank will 
serve as a trustee (on an interim basis). 
Second, progress was made at Bali on the important 
issue of ‘avoided deforestation’ in the developing 
world, especially the logging and burning of tropical 
rainforests (estimated to account for around 20% of 
global emissions each year). Specifically, the Parties 
agreed to ‘explore a range of actions and undertake 
efforts, including demonstration activities, to address 
the drivers of deforestation’.8 This included provision 
for the Subsidiary Body on Scientific and Technological 
Advice to undertake a programme of work on 
methodological issues (e.g. estimating deforestation 
rates, calculating emissions and removals from changing 
land-use patterns, and verifying emission savings from 
preservation efforts). There was also agreement for the 
AWG on Long-term Cooperative Action to examine 
‘policy approaches and positive incentives on issues 
relating to reducing emissions from deforestation 
and forest degradation in developing countries’.9 In 
effect, this agreement opens up the possibility (despite 
earlier objections from Brazil) of using market-based 
mechanisms via the framework of the Kyoto Protocol 
to slow the pace of deforestation (i.e. carbon credits 
would be generated for forests that were protected on 
the basis of their carbon storage value). Not merely does 
this provide a means of achieving a rapid reduction in 
global emissions, but there are important implications 
for CP2. In particular, if Annex 1 Parties have access to 
a substantial quantity of (potentially relatively cheap) 
emission allowances through avoided deforestation 
in developing countries, they will be able to take on 
8 FCCC/SBSTA/2007/L.23/Add.1/Rev.1, 12 December 2007.
9 See FCCC/CP/2007/L.7/Rev.1, 14 December 2007
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much more stringent responsibility targets than would 
otherwise be politically or economically feasible. An 
added benefit is that such an approach would secure 
‘meaningful participation’ by certain developing 
countries in a post-2012 global mitigation effort.
Third, the scope and content of the second review of 
the Kyoto Protocol generated protracted wrangling 
at Bali. On the one hand, most developed countries 
wanted the review to focus on the Protocol’s 
effectiveness in fulfilling the ultimate objective of 
the UNFCCC. An emphasis on effectiveness would 
provide an opportunity to review the (overly simplistic 
and increasingly unwarranted) distinction between 
Annex 1 and non-Annex 1 Parties and highlight the 
need for a more sophisticated approach to delineating 
the mitigation responsibilities of individual countries. 
On the other hand, most developing countries argued 
that the review should focus on the implementation, 
rather than the effectiveness, of the Kyoto Protocol. 
This would draw attention to the responsibilities 
of Annex 1 Parties (and hence any failures to fulfill 
these responsibilities) and thus avoid any attention 
being given to the overall framework of the Protocol, 
including the distinction between Annex 1 and non-
Annex 1 Parties. In the event, it was agreed that the 
second review would focus on how to ‘enhance the 
implementation of the Protocol’.10
Where to from Bali?
What was achieved at Bali was essentially an agreement 
to negotiate a new global climate agreement and to do 
so according to a fixed timetable. To quote Rachmat 
Witoelar (the Indonesian Environment Minister and 
Chairman of COP13): ‘We now have a Bali roadmap, 
we have an agenda and we have a deadline. But we also 
have a huge task ahead of us and time to reach agreement 
is extremely short, so we need to move quickly’ (Carbon 
Positive, 2007).
There can be no guarantee that the forthcoming 
negotiations will be successful. Formidable technical 
issues need to be resolved (e.g. over deforestation and 
sectoral approaches), not to mention the divergent views 
amongst the key players on targets, mechanisms, burden 
sharing, the nature and stringency of CP2 commitments, 
and the legal form of a new global arrangement. And 
even if an agreement is reached at Copenhagen, there 
will be little time for it to be ratified and brought into 
effect before the end of CP1.
Plainly, the negotiating position of the US will be crucial 
to the outcome of COP15. In this regard, there have 
been some promising developments since Bali. First, 
the Bush Administration has, for the first time, backed 
mandatory measures to increase the fuel efficiency of the 
US vehicle fleet. Second, President Bush announced in 
his annual State of the Union address in January 2008 
that the federal government would invest US$2 billion 
over the next three years in a new international fund to 
encourage the adoption of clean energy technologies 
and help developing countries adapt to climate 
change. (Japan, meanwhile, has pledged to contribute 
US$10 billion for similar purposes.) Third, the Bush 
Administration is inching its way towards accepting the 
need to take on a binding emission-reduction target. 
On 26 February, Daniel Price, President Bush’s deputy 
national security adviser for international economic 
affairs, announced that ‘The US is prepared to enter into 
binding international obligations to reduce greenhouse 
gases as part of a global agreement in which all major 
economies similarly undertake binding international 
obligations’ (Black, 2008). Of course, for Brazil, China, 
Mexico and other major emerging economies to agree 
to ‘binding international obligations’ of any kind 
would represent a significiant departure from their 
current negotiating positions. But at least the US is now 
discussing this option. Finally, all three of the leading 
contenders for the US Presidency – Hillary Clinton, 
Barack Obama, and John McCain – have pledged 
to adopt vigorous measures to reduce US emissions. 
Irrespective, therefore, of the outcome of the Presidential 
elections in early November 2008, the US is likely to 
become more favourably disposed to the negotiation of 
a new multilateral climate treaty and more willing to 
provide leadership in securing a positive outcome.
The stance adopted by the major emerging economies 
– especially China and to a lesser extent Brazil and 
India – will also be critical to the success in the 
forthcoming negotiations. China has, in fact, already 
taken measures to curb the growth of its emissions, 
including setting ambitious renewable energy targets for 
2020 (Martinot and Junfeng, 2007, p.14); but much 
more will be required. At the broader level, unresolved 
issues include:
10  See FCCC/KP/CMP/20007/L.8, 14 December 2007.
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•	 What	overall	contribution	will	developing	countries	
be expected to make to the global emission reduction 
effort (e.g. how far below business-as-usual levels will 
developing world emissions need to be by 2020)?
•	 How	should	the	contribution	of	developing	countries	
be shared and on what basis?
•	 What	specific	measures	will	be	required	to	achieve	
the desired emission-reduction objectives and how 
will these be framed (e.g. as emission-reduction goals 
or energy sufficiency and renewable energy goals)?
•	 How	will	domestic	mitigation	efforts	in	developing	
countries be linked to the requirement for ‘measurable, 
reportable and verifiable’ actions? 
•	 What	form	should	any	sectoral	agreements	take	and	
how might these be linked to, and accommodated 
within, the wider framework of responsibility targets 
and ‘measurable, reportable and verifiable’ actions?
For New Zealand, the outcome of the negotiations 
during 2008-09 will have significant implications. 
New Zealand will, of course, be expected to take on 
a responsibility target for CP2 and this is bound to be 
tougher than for CP1. Other things being equal, the 
greater the overall stringency of a new multilateral 
agreement, the deeper the cuts that developed countries 
will be required to make. Whatever the stringency 
of New Zealand’s CP2 responsibility target, it will 
become the starting allocation of emissions units for 
the domestic emissions trading scheme, which is in the 
process of being implemented. 
Given the huge economic, social, political and 
environmental risks associated with unmitigated global 
warming, it is undoubtedly in New Zealand’s interests 
to argue for a comprehensive and robust post-2012 
agreement with ambitious emission-reduction targets. 
But it will also be in the country’s interests to ensure that 
the various policy mechanisms designed to achieve these 
targets are well designed. This means that New Zealand 
must be fully engaged in the various negotiation tracks 
and must, in particular, give serious attention to the 
complex issues surrounding, and the rules for, land use, 
land-use change and forestry – both as they apply for 
developed and developing countries. Achieving vigorous 
and effective measures to reduce global deforestation 
rates is especially important. Not only will this make 
available a potentially large pool of emission allowances 
through which responsibility targets can be met, but lower 
deforestation rates are likely to enhance the global price 
of wood products, thereby increasing returns to New 
Zealand’s forestry industry. Many other policy issues, of 
course, will require active consideration during 2008-09 
(see, for instance, Ward and James, 2007a, 2007b). To 
play an effective role in the Protocol and Convention 
tracks will require a significant investment of intellectual 
effort and diplomatic persuasion. Arguably, few, if any, 
issues are more deserving of such an investment.
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